Ram-Prasad seems to have a poor grasp of what realism is and a fortiori non-realism subtle or gross must elude. What is one to make of this from a 1995 paper on Dreams and the Coherence of Experience
The traditional realist claim is that objects that experience presents as existing externally, do in fact exist internally. The denial of externality appeals both to those who doubt that experience is ever veridical (in other words, who doubt that the objects experience presents are ever exactly identical with existing objects) and also to those who think that experience is veridical only if ob jects are not external.
A simple succinct definition of Realism found in a Dictionary of Philosophy:
theory to the effect that entities of a certain category exist independently of what we think. A consequence of realism in this sense is that the entities are there to be discovered, and that ignorance and error is possible.
Further down he states:
Both the Cartesian skeptic and the Berkeleyan idealist use dreams to challenge externality: a subject takes it that there is experience of a world of external objects, but there need be no such world as seems to be thus experienced. Cognition that there are external objects could therefore occur without such objects.
Did Berkeley use dreams to establish his immaterialism? Was it not a logical following through of Locke's primary and secondary qualities?
So Non-Realism is perhaps not ready to join the big Nons yet. If anyone out there knows more, please relate.
2 comments:
I wonder whether there is not just a typo in the quote by Ram-Prasad:
The traditional realist claim is that objects that experience presents as existing externally, do in fact exist internally.
Should in fact read:
The traditional antirealist claim is that objects that experience presents as existing externally, do in fact exist internally.In fact, the claim at stake is the one of Dharmakīrti's school (also called sahopalambhaniyama).
Elisa:
Thanks for that reply. That does make a difference, adding ‘anti’ to realism. How has that been sitting there since 1995? Poor editing from everyone. However there is a general lack of precision in his work. Consider his use of ‘veridical’ in the sentence I quote. When the ‘external’ object drops away so too does the concept of veridicality. A state of mind, vritti or however you like to put it cannot be veridical in relation to itself. Is this a poor choice of words or a lapse in understanding?
What do you make of his ‘non-realism’? Ethan Mills in his Three Pillars of Skepticism has a note on it which I saw on google books. My feeling is that Mills found it a slippery elusive,concept.
Thanks again,
Michael.
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