Advaitin Antinomy and the Witness: I am Brahman

Advaitin Antinomy:

Knowledge is an action which has its source in the intellect.  The Self does not act but it pervades (analogy alert!) the intellect as it were lighting up the intellectual event.

As is asserted, by the hearing (sravana) of the mahavakya, I am Brahman, the ripe seeker can achieve self-realisation.   Avidya (ignorance/illusion) is dispelled by vidya (knowledge).  But as already asserted the Self does not act; only the intellect or body-mind complex acts.  In that case it would seem that the Self benefits by an action i.e. the access of knowledge.  Is the catalyst which precipitates realisation  the immediate comprehension that it is the action of the Self that gives rise to all the modalities of awareness.  Is this the genesis of the concept of the Witness?

#205:  The Witness is known by Itself which is of the nature of knowledge only.  It is the birth of modifications of the intellect pervaded by the reflection of Consciousness that is what is known to be the knowledge of the Self. (from Upadesa Sahasri Chap.XVIII. Thou Art That)

The modifications of the intellect (vritti) are realised as essentially pure consciousness presenting under the limitation of the individual mind.

Thou art That #159, 160/1/2/3

 #159: It is to the intellect and not to the Self which is immutable, that the knowledge, ‘I am Brahman’ belongs.  Moreover the Self is changeless because it has no other witness.  (Upadesa Sahasri Chap.XVIII)

Here the difference between the intellectual knowledge; our rational conviction, that we are one with the Absolute or the unity of being etc. is being contrasted with actual realisation which is a Self realisation.  A change in knowledge is an action, a new comprehension whereas the Self has no action being immutable.  It is its light which is reflected by the mirror of the mind.

#160: If the agent, the ego, were to feel ‘I am liberated’ freedom from pain and pleasure would not be reasonable with respect to it.

#161/2: The wrong knowledge that one is happy or unhappy due to one’s identification with the body etc., like the pleasure or sorrow due to the possession or loss of an ear-ring, is surely negated by the right knowledge that is Pure Consciousness.

An evidence becoming non-evidence, everything will end in non-existence in the reverse case.

#163:  One feels pain when one’s body gets burnt, cut or destroyed, (because one identifies with it).  Otherwise the Self (which is different from the body) is never pained.  Owing to there being burns etc. in one man another is not pained.

There are many advaitins who take this as stated despite the ample evidence for pain felt by recognised self-realised sages.  Some offer the distinction between suffering and pain.  The jnani feels pain but does not suffer.  Prarabdha karma or that element of karma that must be got through before the body is ‘dropped’ might be a cause of the pain that must be suffered even by the jnani.  In any case there is no identification with the body by an enlightened person.

The other point about enlightenment that has occurred to me is whether one can speak of a time when one became enlightened.  In the histories of saints that attained this state after a period of spiritual practice a time is indicated.  In reality their true nature had never changed.

If asked they might say ‘I am now what I always was, I abide’.

Thou art That #141, #142, #143

 Please tell us (Idealists)  what benefit you derive by holding that knowledge depends on other things.  If it is contended that dependence (of knowledge) on the knower is desirable (we reply that) the knower also, according to us, is nothing but Knowledge.

The intellect itself, though indivisible, is looked upon by deluded people as consisting of the division of the knower, knowing, and the known.

Action, agents etc. consist, according to us, (Idealists) of knowledge only.

(Reply from advaitin). You must accept an agent of this knowledge, if you admit its existence and destruction (every moment).   (#141, #142,  #143 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

The locus classicus for a thoroughgoing refutation of Buddhist Idealism (Vijnanavada) is of course Bsb.Bh. II.ii.28.  It is ironic that what is called British Empiricism shares the same view that what we are in contact with is a state of consciousness and anything further is an inference of some kind or native faith.  In other words we perceive perceptions.

Sankara in this comment on Vijnanavada impugns the annica/annata (no-self/momentariness) aspect since the topic of the chapter is the Self.  Holding that there in no knower only knowing implies that the agent of knowing is created and destroyed in every moment.  Thereby they (Buddhist Idealists) contradict themselves.

Thou art That #136/7

 “Does substantiation mean being known, being endowed with existence, or anything else?  You should remember the two alternatives spoken of in the previous verse if it means ‘being known’.

As it is well-known that all things come in to existence from their causes no effort ( by way of the application of an evidence ) is necessary for substantiation.”  (#136/137 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

This is a puzzling if not somewhat gnomic verse.  What I understand from it is that the Self is self-evident, ‘pratibodha videtam’ known with every state of awareness and therefore substantiation in the received sense of established by the use of evidence does not apply.