Q: What does ignorance/avidya really mean? A: It is not being aware of the true nature of things or working on false assumptions. Now the paradox is that as a working hypothesis those fundamental assumptions can be perfectly effective. They represent the norm of the commonly shared understanding of reality. In plain terms the philosopher distinguishes between what is ‘real’ and what is ‘really real’. More technically ‘ignorance’ is a metaphysical condition not an epistemological one. There is no question of there being an organic defect. In Plato’s thought the same disjunction occurs between what is real i.e. unchanging truth and what is false/unreal constantly changing and in dispute, what never is.
Q: How is ignorance to be overcome?
A: By knowledge.
“If one has realized here, then there is truth; if he has not realized here, then there is great destruction.” (Kena Up. 2:5)
Following the rubric of this particular verse B.G. 13:2
“And, O scion of the Bharata dynasty, understand Me to be the ‘Knower of the Field’ in all the fields. In My opinion, that is Knowledge which is the knowledge of the field and the knower of the field.”
To put it in philosophical terms the question boils down to an investigation of self knowledge and self identity. Allied to that inquiry is the ‘Binding Problem’ as succinctly defined by Wikipedia as:
“The consciousness and binding problem is the problem of how objects, background, and abstract or emotional features are combined into a single experience.”
Shankara goes through the usual pattern of point and counterpoint in his explication of the Advaitin view. Identification with the body-mind and its experiences is the primal form of ignorance. It is akin to the confusion of a stump of a tree at dusk being taken for a man. A simple analogy but like all analogies it can be taken up too linearly and not as a focus on a clarification.
Objection: “The stump and the man, which are verily objects of perception, are superimposed on each other through ignorance by their perceiver. On the other hand, in the case of the body and the Self, the mutual superimposition occurs verily between a knower and an object of perception. Thus the application is not equally applicable.
The conclusion that the objector offers is that the experiences of the body are those of the Self and that there is no other knower other than the body-mind. Shankar’s counter reveals an important aspect of the teaching methods that prevail in Vedanta. Instruction is tailored to the student’s presumed level or the reader’s likely level. Shankara therefore in the response draws on the common assumption, un
-argued for, of the permanence of the Self. If the Self is identified with the perturbations of the mind, death, and disease then it can no longer be regarded as permanent.
As I have observed in a previous post the philosophical argument for the permanence of consciousness and its independence of mental modifications is explicated in Upadesa Sahasri. Here in this commentary the discussion on that level is curtailed which brings the objector to his next ‘gotcha’.
“Objection: Well, if this be so, then owing to the nonexistence of the world and the mundane creatures, there will arise the defect of the uselessness of the scriptures, etc.”
That is an important sticking point for the skeptical and it requires separate treatment. More anon.