Sankara's Treatment of Buddhist concept of Possibility in Brahma Sutrra Bhasya

 In his description  of the Vijnanavada theory of perception which is strikingly like what in Western philosophy would be called subjective idealism Sankara introduces their concept of impossibility.

Accordingto this Vijnanavada, all dealings concerned with means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, and ends of knowledge become possible as subjective occurrences superimposed on consciousness; for even though an external object may exist, there can be no activity of the means of knowledge etc., unless it be through a superimposition of that object on consciousness (i.e.unless the mind or intellect is aware of it). If it be asked, "How, again, can it be known that all these processes are subjective, and that nothing but subjective cognition exists"?-the answer he (the Buddhist) gives is that, this is so because no external thing can possibly exist.

That’s a startling claim also akin to the thought of Berkeley’s immaterialism though the rationale is based on Buddhist atomic theory or what fundamentally exists, a purely metaphysical position being beyond human perceptual capacity.

"This is so because no external thing can possibly exist. When external objects are assumed, they must either be the individual atoms or an aggregate of them--a  pillar for instance. Of these the knowledge of the atoms cannot be acquired through a perception of the pillar etc., for the atoms are not objects of perception.38a And a pillar etc. cannot be a conglomeration of atoms, since the (aggregates like) pillar etc. cannot be ascertained to be either different from or identical with the atoms. Thus also are to be rejected genus, (quality, action), etc. Moreover, knowledge, as it arises, has the common feature of being a mere awareness; but it displays a selective bias for individual forms,such as the knowledge of a pillar, the knowledge of a wall, the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of a cloth, and so on. This particularization cannot be possible unless there be some peculiarity in each individual cognition itself. "

That is a long citation but interesting for its delineation of the core insight which sustains subjective idealism in its myriad forms.  There is a subject, there is an object, there is internal reality and external reality.  How are the two realms to meet unless one be superimposed on the other?  This is the original aporia of metaphysics and there the paths of Realism and Idealism diverge.  To stay with the Buddhist anfractuosity for now Sankara has the answer to the ‘impossibility’ claim, the focus of this post.  He treats it as a flouting of modal direction if you like.

Buddhist : Since no object can possibly exist externally, I come to the conclusion that it appears as though it is outside.

Vedantin : This conclusion is not honest, since the possibility or impossibility of the existence of a thing is determined in accordance with the applicability or non-applicability of the means of knowledge to it, but the applicability or non-applicability of the means of knowledge is not ascertained in accordance with the possibility or impossibility (of the thing).What is known through anyone of the means of knowledge, such as direct perception etc., is possible, and what cannot be known through any one of these means of knowledge is impossible. In the case under discussion, the external things are known individually by the respective means of applicability or non-applicability of the means of knowledge is not ascertained in accordance with the possibility or impossibility (of the thing).

In other words you can’t get the results before you sit the exam.  Impossibility or possibility is ascertained by an application of a criterion, a test of some kind but you cannot say that a thing is impossible because a test cannot be applied.  There must be something to test and there is no testing of the inexistent.  This may also be connected to the Thomist idea that the reality of something guarantees its possibility.

Theories of Self in Sanskrit philosophy in the 9th.Century (from Sankara's Commentary on Brahma Sutras)

 

Sankara’s commentary on the Brahma-Sutra Bhasya I.i.1

Opponent : If Brahman be well known in the world as the Self, then It being already known, there arises the difficulty again that It is not to be deliberated on. 

Vedantin : No, for there is a conflict about Its distinctive nature. Ordinary people as well as the materialists of the Lokayata school recognize the body alone to be the Self possessed of sentience. Others hold that the mind is the Self. Some say that it is merely momentary consciousness. Others say that it i~void. Still others believe that there is a soul, separate from the body, which transmigrates and is the agent (of work) and the experiencer (of results). Some say that the soul is a mere experiencer and not an agent. Some say that there is a God who is different from this soul and is all-knowing and all-powerful;others say that He is the Self of the experiencing individual. Thus there ar emany who follow opposite views by depending on logic, texts and their semblances. If one accepts any one of these views without examination, one is liable to be deflected from emancipation and come to grief. Therefore starting with the presentation of a deliberation on Brahman, here is commenced an ascertainment of the meaning of the texts of the Upanisads with the help of reasoning not opposed to the Upanisads themselves, for the purpose of leading to emancipation (through knowledge).

There you have it, an itemisation of the known theories of the Self and Self-Knowledge in the sphere of Sanskrit philosophy in the 9th.Century. Note that many of its topics did not become salient in Europe until much later.  Momentary consciousness (Annica) a Buddhist doctrine had to wait for Hume and his bundle of perceptions/series of conscious states, theory.  I have written about this at length previously. Follow the topics.

The vijnanavada subjective idealism is akin to that of Kant’s thing in itself and its unknowability.  The whole question of the ‘external’ world and what we really are directly aware of is give a thorough examination by Sankara in the commentary on the Brahma Sutras. (B.S.B. II.ii.28)

Materialism is mentioned and so forth and so on.  Suffice it to say that Sankara was not a mere theologian, an idea that is often encountered in academic circles.  He wants to test those theories using rational means to uncover contradictions and fallacies.  His critiques are well worth an examination by readers who have chiefly focused on the Western canon.

Realism is Gravity

  

À hidden but powerful teleological motivation also intervenes at this point,to which  idealism unconsciously obeys, so cheating at its own game. Idealism's concern is precisely that it be not led to a certain terminus; it aims to avoid a certain final conclusion. Now if, from the very start, things and the extramental stability whereby they regulate our thought are so carefully rejected, it is because of the fact, above all else, that owing to a secret instinct that is the more imperious in that it remains unconfessed, the mind does not want in the end to be forced to come face to face with a transcendent, supreme reality, an abyss of personality before which every heart lies open and which our thought has to adore. The bastions and fortresses of idealistic philosophy thus appear to be just so many vast defence-works against divine personality. (from 'The Degrees of Knowledge' by Jacques Maritain)

  

This is important enough for Shankara to turn his mind to Vijnanavada.  Ontology is Theology and those that are bogged down in ‘Is it Theology or Philosophy’ miss being serious and remain essentially light floating away from the earth.  Realism is Gravity.

Advaitic Realism versus Buddhist Idealism (Vijnanavada/Yogacara)

 I have entered the whole section of B.S.Bh II.ii.28 (below) as it is worth reading in toto but here my focus is on the paragraph beginning ‘This conclusion is not honest’.

The Buddhist has a theory that holds that all cognition is internal  and is immediately self-luminous.  For him this supplies all that is required for experience and the very idea of an external object is a redundant and pointless fabrication that has no grounding in reality.  This is what he means by impossibility.

Sankara then examines this notion by resorting to the ontological position reminiscent of the Scholastic: what is is possible.  How do we discover what is (quid est)?  We ask ourselves whether the valid means of knowledge (pramana) can be applied to it and if so then it is possible (posse est).  What you cannot hold is the converse namely that possibility brings on a quasi existence.  ((Here come Zombies))

Vasubandhu’s (Vijnanavada/Yogacara teacher)  saying “The non-existent is imagined” is a variant of this possibility thesis.

Vijnanavada from B.S.Bh. II.ii.28:

Vijnanavadin:  (External objects are) not non-existent, for perceived.

Advaitin: It cannot be asserted that external things do not exist

Vijnanavadin: Why?

Vedantin: “Because they are perceived.” As a matter of fact such thingsas a pillar, a wall, a pot, a cloth, are perceived along with each act of cognition. And it cannot be that the very thing perceived is non-existent. How can a man’s words be acceptable who while himself perceiving an external object through sense-contacts still says, “I do not perceive, and that object does not exist”, just as much as a man while eating and himself experiencing­ the satisfaction arising from that act might say, “Neither do I eat, nor do I get any satisfaction”?

Vijnavadin:    Well, I do not say that I do not perceive any object, but all that I hold is ‘that I do not perceive anything  apart from the perception.

Vedantin: Yes, you do speak like that, since you have no curb) to your mouth; but you do not speak logically, for some­thing other than the perception has to be admitted perforce, just because it is perceived. Not that anybody cognises a perception to be a pillar, a wall, etc., rather all people cognise a pillar, a wall, etc. as objects of perception. And it is for this reason that all people understand those others (viz the Buddhists) as really assuming the existence of an external thing even while they deny it by saying, “That which is the content of an internal awareness appears as though external”. For they use the phrase “as though” in the clause “as though external” just because they too become aware of a cognition appearing externally in the same way as is well known ‘to all people, and yet ‘they want to deny any external’ object.   Else why should they say, “as though external”? For ‘nobody speaks thus: “Vistumitra appears like the son of a barren woman”. Accordingly, those who accept truth to be just what it is actually perceived to be, should accept a thing as it actually reveals itself externally, and not “as ‘though appearing outside”.

Buddhist. Since no object can possibly exist externally, I  come to ‘the conclusion that it appears as though it is outside.

Vedantin. This conclusion is not honest, since the possibility or impossibility of the existence of a thing is determined in accordance with ‘the applicability or non-applicability of the means of knowledge to it, but the applicability or non applicability of the means of knowledge is not ascertained in a accordance with the possibility or impossibility (of the thing) What is known through any one of the means of knowledge, direct perception etc., is possible, and what cannot be through any one of these means of knowledge is impossible.  In the case under discussion, the external things are known individually by the respective means of knowledge; so how can they be declared to be impossible by raising such alternatives as different, non-different, etc. For external things are perceived as a matter of fact. It is wrong to say that external things do not exist merely on the ground that cognition is seen to have the likeness of an object, because the very likeness of an object is not possible unless the object itself be there, and also because the object is cognised outside. So also it has to be admitted that  the regularity in the simultaneous appearance of the cognition and its object is owing to the relation of causality between them and not owing to their identity. Again, in (such forms of awareness as) “knowledge of a pot”, “knowledge of a cloth’ difference is seen in the two qualifying parts, pot and cloth, but not in the substantive part knowledge, even as in the case “a white cow” and “a black cow” we find that whiteness and blackness alone differ, but not so the cowhood. And the difference of the one (viz cowhood) from the two (whiteness, blackness) stands out clearly, as also the difference of the two from the one. Therefore an object and its knowledge differ. Similar should be our comprehension in the cases of the seeing of a and the remembrance of a pot. Here also the substantives. seeing and remembering differ, but not so the adjectival viz pot; this is just as in the cases of the cognitions, “the smell of milk”, and “the taste of milk”, where the substantives smell and taste alone differ, but not so the adjectival part milk.

Moreover, as regards two cognitions occurring successively, which vanish after self-revelation, there can be no logical appre­hension of the one by the other. And in that case will be nul­lified all the assertions made in the Buddhist scriptures them­selves about the difference among cognitions, momentariness and other attributes, individual characteristics, common charac­teristics, bequeathing of tendency by one cognition to the other, true, false, or mixed attributes arising from contact with nescience, as also about bondage, liberation, and so on.

Again, if one admits a distinction between knowledge and knowledge, why should not one admit external objects such as a pillar, a wall, and so on?

Buddhist:      A cognition is actually perceived.

Vedantin; External things too are perceived, and so they too should be admitted.

Buddhist:      Since cognition is a luminous thing it stands self-revealed like a lamp, but an external object is not like that.

Vedantin:    Then like assuming that fire burns itself, you assume that something can act on itself by itself, which is absolutely opposed to reason; yet you do not admit the well-known fact, bearing no contradiction, that an external object is known through a cognition which is different from the object. What a great display of erudition you make! It cannot be asserted that consciousness is known to itself as something apart from objects for the simple reason that there can be no action on oneself.

Buddhist. If a cognition has to be known by some entity other than itself, that second one will have to be known by another, and that one again by another. This will lead to an Infinite regress. Moreover, since cognition is an illuminator like a lamp, if you should imagine a second cognition (to know it), then since both the cognitions are similar there will be no revela­tion of the one by the other, so that this whole assumption will fall to the ground.

Vedantin: Both these arguments are wrong, for once an awareness of the cognition occurs, no further desire to appre­hend the witness of the cognition can arise; and so there is no possibility of infinite regress.  And since the witness and the cognition are different by nature, there can be a relationship of the perceiver and the perceived among them. Besides, the self-evident witness cannot be denied. There is another consideration. When you assert that cognition shines by itself like a lamp without requiring some other cognition, you virtually say that a cognition is not apprehended by. any other means of knowledge or by anything else, which would be like saying that a thousand lamps shine (unknown) within a massive boulder.

Buddhist:      Exactly so; for cognition being of the nature of an awareness (suggested by you), you have only approved the view that we hold.

Vedantin:      No, for it is seen that some other perceiver. having the eye etc. as his instrument, perceives a lamp etc. So it is understood that since cognition has equally to be revealed by some one else, it can be perceived like a lamp only when a distinct perceiver is present.

Buddhist:      By upholding the theory that the perceiving wit­ness is self-effulgent, you only accept under a different garb of words my own view that cognition shines by itself.

Vedantin:      Not so, for you admit many such distinctions for cognition as origin, destruction, multiplicity, and so on. And hence it is that we establish the apprehension of that cognition by some entity outside it, as in the case of a lamp.

Thou art That #141, #142, #143

 Please tell us (Idealists)  what benefit you derive by holding that knowledge depends on other things.  If it is contended that dependence (of knowledge) on the knower is desirable (we reply that) the knower also, according to us, is nothing but Knowledge.

The intellect itself, though indivisible, is looked upon by deluded people as consisting of the division of the knower, knowing, and the known.

Action, agents etc. consist, according to us, (Idealists) of knowledge only.

(Reply from advaitin). You must accept an agent of this knowledge, if you admit its existence and destruction (every moment).   (#141, #142,  #143 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

The locus classicus for a thoroughgoing refutation of Buddhist Idealism (Vijnanavada) is of course Bsb.Bh. II.ii.28.  It is ironic that what is called British Empiricism shares the same view that what we are in contact with is a state of consciousness and anything further is an inference of some kind or native faith.  In other words we perceive perceptions.

Sankara in this comment on Vijnanavada impugns the annica/annata (no-self/momentariness) aspect since the topic of the chapter is the Self.  Holding that there in no knower only knowing implies that the agent of knowing is created and destroyed in every moment.  Thereby they (Buddhist Idealists) contradict themselves.

Possible Evidence and Evidently Possible (B.S.B. II.i.28 on Vijnanavada))

Should the existence or non-existence of a thing depend on the possibility or impossibility of the evidence for that thing? If we accept that view, the road to the ontological argument lies open and inevitable. Should we rather not hold that the possibility or impossibility of a thing is decided on the basis of being able to apply the means of knowledge to it. What can be perceived is evidently possible. This would include cloud chamber data and so forth. However, in this case the contrary to the possible is not the impossible but the theoretical for which we have as yet not devised empirical means of gaining evidence for.

Is idealism the chasm between the object and its evidence?