Sankara’s remarks on apoha (Buddhist Nominalism) which has its source in annica (momentariness) are succinct and of course dismissive. Apoha is consistent with that ontological theory following through to a tortuous ignotum per ignotius. I submit that though Buddhism is full of skilful means the alarming complacency of this attempt has a forlorn hope of justification.
#145: Destruction has for its ultimate limit something which is self-existent. (You say that) destruction is the negation of non-destruction. A cow is defined according to you as the non-existence of a non-cow. It cannot be the definition of a cow.
#146: Things denoted by the word ‘momentary’ are also, according to you, only the negation of things that are non-momentary.
The annica theory denies that there can be an unchanging existent ‘cowness’ universal. Allied to that is the empiricist objection that the universal ‘cow’ is not experienced, only the particular cow now dubbed the non non-cow is experienced. The obvious objection to this double negation is that lurking under the appelation non-cow is a something that is a something.
#147: (The Idealists). As there cannot be any difference in non-existence differences are due to names only. (Reply) Please tell me how there can be manyness in one (indivisible non-existence) due only to different names?
#148: How can the negation (of a non-cow) denote a cow if by the word negation the negation of different things is meant? (Again) no negation distinguishes one thing from another, nor can special properties do it.
By annica nothing is, there is just a mere flux, so the non-cows cannot be negated either as they have no substantial existence.
#149: Just as names, species, etc. (do not qualify Knowledge) according to you as it has no special properties, (so the negation of a non-cow, hornlessness etc. do no qualify a cow).
'Knowledge' referred to there is a pure self-luminous cognition of momentary events.
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